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TRAIL TO PERDITION: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S “EMISSION” 
OMISSION DISPOSITION 
Jordan Luebkemann* 
A protracted case in the Ninth Circuit, Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., has pitted numerous stakeholders, including 
two national governments, against one another in a battle to define 
the meaning of “disposal” within the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”). At issue were one hundred years of aerial emissions 
of heavy metals and other hazardous substances that were 
produced in Canada by a lead smelting and refining operation, but 
had accumulated on an Indian reservation in the state of 
Washington. Relying on two key Ninth Circuit cases, and the lack 
of the word “emission” among the statutorily enumerated methods 
of “disposal,” a panel of the Ninth Circuit held in July that aerial 
emissions of hazardous materials could not give rise to CERCLA 
liability. 
This holding is problematic for a number of reasons. Most 
fundamentally, it misapplied the circuit’s earlier precedent, which 
did not require the result announced in Pakootas. In doing so, the 
court excluded an entire media of pollution from a remedial statute 
that Congress intended to be construed expansively. As a practical 
matter, the court’s Pakootas holding provides a strong argument 
for industrial polluters seeking to evade CERCLA liability, and 
possibly removes the only judicial means of addressing 
transnational air pollution entering the United States from 
neighboring countries and beyond. 
 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018. The author 
would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their attentive comments 
and encouragement, particularly Elizabeth Windham, Shannon O’Neil, Caroline 
Poma, and Sam Helton. The author would also like to thank Professors Maria 
Savasta-Kennedy and Heather Payne for their insightful guidance and review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One early morning in 1969, an assistant dean at the University 
of Southern Mississippi set out fishing near Hattiesburg, but was 
later found dead in his boat.1 Upon investigation, it was discovered 
that the unlucky man had asphyxiated after drifting into an 
invisible pocket of propane gas emitted by a wash pipe from a 
nearby petroleum refinery and into the river.2 Several years later, 
the United States House of Representatives offered this particular 
anecdote alongside a litany of other examples that demonstrated 
“actual instances of damage caused by current hazardous waste 
disposal practices” and the necessity of a new regulatory scheme to 
address discarded wastes.3 Congress enacted this new legislation, 
                                                
 1 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 23 (1976). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. pt.1 at 17. 
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the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),4 after the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act5, seeking to eliminate the last 
remaining loopholes in environmental law: unregulated land 
disposal, discarded materials, and hazardous wastes.6 The purview 
of RCRA addresses “not only solid wastes,” but it also includes 
“liquid and contained gaseous wastes, semi-solid waste, and 
sludges.”7 
Subsequently, RCRA lent its definition of “disposal” to a new 
environmental regulatory scheme.8 The Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”)9 was enacted to provide a framework for cleaning up 
hazardous waste sites and shifting the costs of that work and any 
damages to responsible parties.10 CERCLA features, in the words 
of one commenter, “a radical liability scheme that with only a little 
exaggeration can be summarized thus: liability is strict, joint, 
several, retroactive and perpetual.”11 Although CERCLA borrows 
several of its definitions from other statutes,12 its importation of 
RCRA’s “disposal” has been the subject of considerable 
contention. A protracted case in the Ninth Circuit, Pakootas v. 
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,13 has pitted a private company, a tribe, 
                                                
 4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2016). 
   5 See generally 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387. 
 6 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4. 
 7 Id. at 2. 
 8 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2016). 
 9 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2016). 
 10 Walter E. Mugdan, Superfund: Still Super, Still Fun 323 (Am. Law Inst., 
2015), 
http://files.alicle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CX010_chapter_09_t
humb.pdf.                              
 11 Id. 
 12 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29)–(30) (importing definitions for “disposal”, 
“hazardous waste”, “treatment”, “territorial sea”, and “contiguous zone” from 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act [Resource Conversation and Recovery Act] and 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act]). 
 13 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). This 
decision represents the latest of many accruing over this case’s tumultuous 
twelve year history of amended complaints and appeals. For the purposes of this 
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a state, and two national governments against each other to define 
this term and its application, while the resulting decision will 
generate potentially far-reaching implications for CERCLA 
litigation. 
This Recent Development examines the Pakootas decision 
within the dual social and legal contexts of air pollution. Part II 
introduces the factual backdrop of the Trail Smelter and particular 
hazards posed to public health by smelting technologies, while Part 
III presents the regulatory frameworks at issue. Part IV analyzes 
the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision, arguing that the court 
misapplied its precedent in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal 
Corp.,14 and Center for Community Action and Environmental 
Justice v. BNSF Railroad Co. (“CCAEJ”).15 Part V concludes with 
an examination of the (im)practical repercussions of the decision 
as written. 
II. FACTUAL HISTORY 
How did a small settlement, overlooking the Columbia River in 
the Canadian wilderness, come to have significant effects on 
humans, the environment, and international law? This part traces 
the social and legal background of the Trail Smelter and the Upper 
Columbia River (“UCR”).16 Section A establishes the origins of the 
smelter and its long shadow, while Section B considers a brief 
procedural overview of the present controversy. 
                                                                                                         
recent development, all mentions of “Pakootas” or “the Pakootas court” will 
refer solely to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on July 27, 2016. 
 14 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 15 Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R.R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 16 This Recent Development adopts the EPA’s definition for the site as “the 
areal extent of contamination in the United States associated with the Upper 
Columbia River, and all suitable areas in proximity to the contamination 
necessary for implementation of response action.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER FOR REMEDIAL 
INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY (IN THE MATTER OF: UPPER COLUMBIA 
RIVER SITE), § II, ¶ 1 (2003), 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/CLEANUP.NSF/82751e55bf4ef18488256ecb008
35666/f0e551fb8a69dcd288256fac00064739/$FILE/TeckComincoUAOscan.pdf 
[hereinafter “EPA UAO”]. 
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A. Upper Columbia River Site and the Trail Smelter 
For more than 9000 years, indigenous peoples have made their 
home in the UCR region, where in 1872, the United States 
government granted a reservation to the Colville Tribes by treaty.17 
Although subsequent agreements limited the extent of this 
territory, the Colville Tribes maintain a reservation along a portion 
of the Columbia River known as Lake Roosevelt18 and retain 
certain rights over “hunting, fishing, boating, and cultural 
resources” along parts of the former territory.19 
In 1896, some ten miles north of Washington State, a smelter 
was erected along the Columbia River in Trail, British Columbia, 
to refine copper and gold.20 Over time, the Trail Smelter grew in 
size and output, shifting its production to lead and zinc, and adding 
400-foot tall smokestacks to disperse the thousands of tons of 
sulfur dioxide it released monthly.21 These higher stacks may have 
marginally eased local tensions in Trail, where citizens suffered 
damage to crops and livestock, but they also contributed to 
increased pollution in Washington’s Colombia Valley.22 
Ultimately, it took an international arbitration tribunal and well 
over a decade to resolve claims of Washington citizens and the 
smelter operators.23 Although the tribunal ordered that the Trail 
Smelter “should avoid air emissions that harm Washington,” and 
                                                
 17 Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the 
Extraterritorial Application of CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 
(2005). 
 18 A reservoir created by the creation of the Grand Coulee Dam in 1942. 
 19 Hess, supra note 17, at 9. 
 20 Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Prologue? 
EPA Blazes A New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 243 (2006). 
 21 Id. at 244. The process of lead refining comprises three basic steps: (1) 
sintering, (2) reduction, and (3) refining. Because lead naturally occurs as a 
sulfide ore, the primary goal of the sintering phase is to reduce sulfur content of 
the ore, which is burned off and leaves the plant as sulfur dioxide. However, in 
addition to aerial emissions of sulfur dioxide, “nearly every process” involved in 
primary lead smelting and refining emits lead fumes and particulate matter. 
Background Report: AP-42 Section 12.6: Primary Lead Smelting and Refining, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch12/bgdocs/b12s06.pdf. 
 22 Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 245–46. 
 23 Id. 
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that Canada would be liable for damages resulting from future 
emissions, the smelter continued to discard waste products into the 
air and water around its plant.24 Throughout the twentieth century, 
the Smelter passed through several mergers and iterations of 
management before coming to rest with Teck Cominco Metals, 
Ltd. (“Teck”), which currently operates the site.25 
Today, Teck boasts that the facility is one of the “world’s 
largest fully integrated zinc and lead smelting complexes,” 
producing 307,000 tons of refined zinc26 and 117,600 tons of lead 
concentrate27 in 2015. However, in addition to refined ore, the 
smelter continued to produce immense quantities of waste product. 
In particular, each year until 1995, its operations discharged up to 
145,000 tons of slag, a heavy-metal laden by-product of the 
smelting processes, directly into the Columbia River.28 From its 
introduction in Trail, the Columbia carried the slag downriver into 
the UCR, where it accumulated along the shores and sediments of 
Lake Roosevelt.29 This contamination ultimately set in motion the 
proceedings that culminated in the Ninth Circuit’s July 2016 
Pakootas decision. 
B. Procedural History of the Pakootas Saga 
After a half century of continued emissions, the Colville Tribes 
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in 1999 
to study the UCR for alleged hazards to human health and 
environmental contamination from Teck’s discharges.30 These 
preliminary assessments found “elevated levels of arsenic, lead, 
mercury and other contaminants in the lake,” with contamination 
                                                
 24 Hess, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 25 “Consolidated Mining purchased [the Trail Smelter] in 1906, renamed itself 
Cominco in 1966, and merged with Teck Ltd., becoming Teck Cominco Metals, 
Ltd., in 2001.” Id. at 5. 
 26 Trail Operations, TECK COMINCO, 
http://www.teck.com/operations/canada/operations/trail-operations/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016). 
 27 Other Metals, TECK COMINCO, http://www.teck.com/products/other-metals/ 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
 28 EPA UAO, supra note 16 § II, ¶ 9. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 267–68. 
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levels severe enough to render the UCR eligible for listing as a 
Superfund site.31 As discussed in greater length in Part III, 
Superfund listing recognizes a particular site as one of the most 
contaminated in the United States and raises extensive funding to 
clean up that site.32 
Following the breakdown of an informal negotiation process 
with the Canadian smelter operators,33 the EPA issued a Unilateral 
Administrative Order (“UAO”) to Teck, requiring the company to 
complete a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
(“RI/FS”).34 The purpose of the RI/FS is to determine the extent of 
contamination at the UCR site and to “develop and evaluate 
potential remedial alternatives that prevent, mitigate, or otherwise 
respond to or remedy any release of . . . hazardous substances” at 
the site.35 
Two individual enrolled members of the Confederated Tribes 
of the Colville Reservation brought the original Pakootas36 suit in 
2003 against Teck to enforce the previously disregarded UAO.37 
This suit brought CERCLA claims for Teck’s contamination of the 
Columbia River for direct discharge of hazardous materials in both 
                                                
 31 Matthew Preusch, Pollution Dispute in Northwest Straddles the Border, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/20/us/pollution-
dispute-in-northwest-straddles-the-border.html?_r=1. See infra Part III.A for a 
discussion of Superfund listing under CERCLA. 
 32 See infra Part III.A. 
 33 Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 267–68. 
 34 EPA UAO, supra note 16, § V, ¶¶ 1–5(a). 
 35 Id. § V, ¶ 5(a). 
 36 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 37 Following the 2006 Ninth Circuit decision, Teck and its separately 
incorporated American counterpart, Teck Cominco American, Inc. (“TCAI”), 
entered into a settlement with the EPA, in which the companies agreed to 
complete the RI/FS for the UCR Site. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION AND 
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solid and liquid form.38 After a truly byzantine case history, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper,39 the Plaintiffs sought, and 
ultimately were granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint, 
which added an airborne theory of CERCLA liability for Teck’s 
aerial emissions “including, but not limited to, lead compounds, 
arsenic compounds, cadmium compounds and mercury 
compounds,” which had come to be located in, and cause harm at 
the UCR.40 
When Teck moved to strike or dismiss the aerial-disposition 
claims, the district court denied the motion.41 Shortly thereafter, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled in Center for Community Action and 
Environmental Justice v. BNSF (“CCAEJ”) that RCRA could not 
reach diesel exhaust from idling railyard locomotives,42 prompting 
Teck to file a motion to reconsider with the district court.43 
Specifically, Teck sought reconsideration of the court’s decision to 
allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include aerial claims, 
as well as for the court’s rejection of Teck’s motion to dismiss 
those claims.44 
                                                
 38 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 39 The early phases of the litigation concerned numerous objections to 
jurisdiction by Teck, during which the Canadian smelter stipulated that it had 
discharged slag into the Columbia River in Canada, with the result that some of 
that slag arrived at the UCR Site in the United States, “where it has leached and 
continues to leach hazardous substances into the water and sediment of the 
Columbia River,” causing “at least $1” in damages. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016). Despite Teck’s claims that it 
was beyond the reach of American law, after determining jurisdiction satisfied, 
the court found Teck liable as a CERCLA “arranger” on Plaintiffs’ “river 
pathway” claims, because it “had intentionally disposed of waste into the 
Columbia River knowing that at least some of it would flow across the border.” 
Id. For greater treatment of the early procedural history and the international law 
issues, see generally Libin Zhang, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2007). 
 40 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 41 Id. at 980. 
 42 See discussion of Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R.R. Co., 
764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), infra Part IV.B. 
 43 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 
7408399, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014). 
 44 Id. 
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Although the district court distinguished the Pakootas aerial 
claims from earlier Ninth Circuit precedent, it recognized that with 
respect to how RCRA’s “disposal” is to be applied in the context 
of CERCLA, “no court ha[d] addressed this issue head-on.”45 
Consequently, the court certified its order for an immediate 
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit,46 leading to the Pakootas 
decision considered herein. This Recent Development now 
examines key provisions of CERCLA and RCRA as a foundation 
for analyzing the errors of the Pakootas decision. 
III. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
If the general stereotype is that national environmental 
regulatory statutes are dense and complicated, neither CERCLA 
nor RCRA represent a deviation from that rule. The Ninth Circuit 
has previously observed that, “neither a logician nor a grammarian 
will find comfort” in CERCLA’s “maze” of regulations.47 This part 
seeks to explain the basic thrust and relevant requirements of (A) 
CERCLA and (B) RCRA, before turning to the Ninth Circuit’s 
recent application of these statutes in Part IV. 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act 
Enacted in 1980, CERCLA has two principle goals: “(1) to 
ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, 
and (2) to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances 
bear the cost of remedying the conditions they created.”48 To 
                                                
 45 Id. at *4. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880, 883 (9th Cir. 
2001). The court went on to liken a search though CERCLA’s legislative history 
akin to a “snark hunt.” Id. at 885. 
 48 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 968 
(9th Cir. 2013) (alteration omitted)). 
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empower the act to complete these purposes, courts have generally 
interpreted CERCLA’s definitions and mandates liberally.49 
To meet the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites around the 
country, CERCLA created the “Superfund” Program as a trust to 
cover the formulation and execution of decontamination plans.50 
As there are thousands of waste sites scatted across the country, the 
EPA created the National Priority List in 1983 to prioritize 
response action under Superfund.51 In turn, a combination of 
Congressional appropriations and CERCLA penalties paid by 
responsible parties finances Superfund.52 
To establish liability under CERCLA, the Act requires a 
plaintiff to meet each of four elements: 
(1) the site on which the hazardous substances 
are contained is a “facility” under CERCLA’s 
definition of that term, Section 101(9), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(9); 
(2) a “release” or “threatened release” of any 
“hazardous substance” from the facility has 
occurred, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); 
(3) such “release” or “threatened release” has 
caused the plaintiff to incur response costs that were 
“necessary” and “consistent with the national 
contingency plan,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4) and 
(a)(4)(B); and 
                                                
 49 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 
F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We construe CERCLA liberally to achieve 
these goals.”). See also infra note 115. 
 50  What is the “Superfund” Program?, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, http://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/faq/2009/08/what-is-the-
superfund-program.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 51 Superfund History, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-history (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 52  This is Superfund: A Community Guide to EPA’s Superfund Program 3, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/175197.pdf. 
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(4) the defendant is within one of four classes of 
persons subject to the liability provisions of Section 
107(a).53 
Regarding the first element, in addition to buildings and 
structures that might be contemplated by lay use of the word 
“facility,” under CERCLA, the term encompasses “any site or area 
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed 
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.”54 For the second 
element, a “release” of a “hazardous substance” means “any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
into the environment” of any substance designated as hazardous by 
any of several other federal regulatory schemes.55 As to the fourth 
element, the classes of liable persons56 (“potentially responsible 
parties” or “PRPs”) include, inter alia, “any person who by 
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal . . . of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any 
other party or entity, at any facility.”57 Although the terms 
“dispose,” “disposal,” and “disposing” appear throughout these 
provisions, to add to the challenges of this dense recovery scheme, 
CERCLA does not itself define the term, but rather adopts its 
definition from RCRA.58 
                                                
 53 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 
(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 
(9th Cir. 1989)). 
 54 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2016). 
 55 Id. § 9601(14), (22) (emphasis added). The definition specifically 
enumerates the CWA, CAA, RCRA, and TSCA (the Toxic Substances Control 
Act). 
 56 Id. § 9601(21). A “person” as defined by CERCLA includes “an individual, 
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, 
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. Id. 
 57 Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
 58 See id. § 9601(29). 
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B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The first objective of RCRA is to “promote the protection of 
health and the environment.”59 The statute enumerates eleven 
strategies to reach this objective, including the “application of solid 
waste management, resource recovery, and resource conservation 
systems which preserve and enhance the quality of air, water, and 
land resources.”60 Thus, while RCRA may properly be considered 
a regulatory scheme for solid waste, it does not follow that aerial 
disposition of solid waste is beyond its contours.61 Within this 
context, the RCRA “disposal” refers to the 
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or 
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on 
any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous 
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment 
or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, 
including ground waters.62 
Notably, the word “emitting” is absent from this definition of 
“disposal.”63 As described herein, the Ninth Circuit attached great 
significance to this omission in Pakootas. The following section 
analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s “disposal” jurisprudence across 
several RCRA and CERCLA cases. 
IV. THEORIES OF “DISPOSAL” 
This part examines the recent evolution of the body of law 
construing RCRA and CERCLA “disposal” in the Ninth Circuit 
leading to the Pakootas decision here at issue. Section A focuses 
on the 2001 en banc decision in Carson Harbor, while Section B 
unpacks the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 holding in CCAEJ. After 
examining these two primary decisions on which Pakootas relies, 
                                                
 59 Id. § 6902(a). 
 60 Id. § 6902(a)(10) (emphasis added). 
 61 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6. 
 62 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016). 
 63 See id. Compare to CERCLA definition for “release,” which includes 
“disposing,” “emitting,” “emptying,” “escaping,” “leaching,” “pouring,” and 
“pumping,” in addition to “discharging,” “dumping,” “injecting,” “leaking,” and 
“spilling”—forms that overlap the RCRA/CERCLA definition for “disposal.” 
Id. § 9601(22). 
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Section C turns to that decision itself to analyze its weaknesses. 
Finally, Section D suggests how the court could have arrived at a 
better decision, and why Supreme Court review is important to 
protect Congress’ intent for CERCLA. 
A. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp. 
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp. provides the 
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s Pakootas holding that Congress could 
not have intended passive migration to trigger liability under 
CERCLA.64 A closer look at this case demonstrates Carson 
Harbor’s far more nuanced final holding, including the rejection of 
a bright-line rule for passive migration liability.65 
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. (“Carson”) operated a mobile 
home park in southern California.66 The land, which Carson 
previously acquired from another mobile home operator 
(“Partnership defendants”), had been leased to the Unocal 
Corporation from 1945 to 1983, during which Unocal used the 
property in oil exploitation, operating numerous wells, pipelines, 
storage tanks, and other elements of petroleum production.67 When 
Carson attempted to refinance the property in 1993, the operation 
discovered hazardous tar-like and slag materials in an open-flow 
wetland covering a part of the property.68 Carson was required to 
remove the materials and brought suit to seek recovery of its 
$285,000 in expenses from Unocal, the Partnership defendants, 
and several other parties.69 
                                                
 64 See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 65 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“We therefore reject the absolute binary “active/passive” distinction used 
by some courts.”). 
   66 Id. at 868. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. Further investigation confirmed the hazardous materials were by-
products and wastes from petroleum production, which had remained on the 
property since well before the mobile home park was developed. Id. 
 69 See id. at 868–70. The complaint also identified the County of Los Angeles, 
Cities of Compton and Carson, and Caltrans (the California Department of 
Transportation), which operates an adjacent freeway, a three-mile section of 
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The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants 
on the CERCLA claims,70 from which Carson appealed. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed that there was no liability for the Partnership 
defendants, but reversed the lower court, finding summary 
judgment inappropriate as to Unocal and the Government 
defendants.71 
Within the four requirements of a CERCLA claim,72 the final 
element requires a showing that the defendant is a PRP, which in 
this case, turned on whether or not a “disposal” had occurred 
during each defendant’s successive tenure of the property.73 Based 
on its interpretation of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
despite the “passive migration” of contaminants through the soil 
concurrent with the Partnership defendants’ ownership, no 
“disposal” took place during that time.74 
Relying on the plain meaning of RCRA’s definition of 
disposal, the court found significant that within the same statute 
“release” was defined by a list that included “disposal,” as well as 
several other forms, indicating it is a broader term than 
“disposal.”75 Limiting its attention to the plain meaning of the 
terms defining “disposal,” the court determined that none of the 
plain meanings of “discharge,” “deposit,” “injection,” “dumping,” 
“spilling,” “leaking,” or “placing” was applicable to the migration 
of hydrocarbons through the wetlands during the ownership of the 
Partnership defendants.76 
However, the court was careful to “reject the absolute binary 
‘active/passive’ distinction used by some courts,”77 engaging 
                                                                                                         
which drains into the wetlands. Id. at 868. Collectively, the court referred to this 
group as the “Government defendants.” Id. 
 70 See id. at 870. Originally, Carson also brought additional RCRA and CWA 
claims which it did not pursue on appeal. Id. at 870 n.2. 
 71 See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 888. 
 72 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 73 See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 874. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id. at 878; see also supra note 63. 
 76 See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879–80. 
 77 See id. There is a multi-tiered circuit split regarding both (1) whether 
CERCLA liability is available for “passive” migration of hazardous materials 
and (2) how to determine what constitutes active, versus passive, migrations. See 
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instead in a more factual, case-specific analysis. In fact, the court 
explicitly states that while “‘disposal’ does not include passive soil 
migration . . . it may include other passive migration,” recognizing 
that “[h]olding passive owners responsible for migration of 
contaminants that results from their conduct and for passive 
migration ensures the prompt and effective cleanup” intended by 
Congress enactment of CERCLA.78 Thus, Carson Harbor does not 
stand for the proposition that CERCLA forecloses liability for any 
passive migration, despite attempts by the Pakootus court to 
shoehorn it in to that position. Section C develops the flaw of this 
mischaracterization. 
B. Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. 
BNSF R. Co. 
In addition to Carson Harbor, the Court in Pakootas drew 
heavily on Center for Community Action and Environmental 
Justice in rejecting the Plaintiffs’ aerial-based CERCLA claims. 
CCAEJ featured a RCRA claim to enjoin two defendant rail yard 
operating companies from emitting diesel particulate matter 
(“DPM”) via sixteen railyards across California.79 Environmental 
groups sued the two organizations on the basis that the defendants 
allow DPM to be “discharged into the air, from which it falls onto 
the ground and water nearby” before becoming “re-entrained into 
the air by wind, air currents and passing vehicles,” causing harm at 
each step, as people inhale the airborne particles.80 The district 
court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.81 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order, strictly 
                                                                                                         
generally Khara Coleman, Disposing of Leaks and Spills: Passive Disposal of 
Hazardous Wastes Under CERCLA, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 945 (2002). 
 78 Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 881. 
 79 See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 
1021 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 80 Id. Plaintiffs cite to California Air Resources Board, which has conducted 
studies finding over 1.8 million Californians subject to increased risks for cancer 
precisely due to railyard operations. Id. 
 81 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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construing the definition of “disposal” based on its statutory and 
legislative history.82 
By rephrasing the requirements of the RCRA citizen suit 
provision83 to address plaintiffs’ claim, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that, in order to survive summary judgment, plaintiffs would have 
to plausibly allege “that Defendants have contributed to the past or 
are contributing to the present handling, treatment, transportation, 
or disposal of diesel particulate matter.”84 The Ninth Circuit once 
again turned to a textual analysis of RCRA’s definition of 
“disposal,” first finding that the lack of reference to “emitting,” 
despite its inclusion within the definition of “release,” meant that 
Congress had intended to exclude it.85 
Secondly, the court determined RCRA’s “disposal” 
definition—referring to enumerated means of introducing solid “or 
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid 
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the 
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any 
waters”86—to create a temporal requirement whereby solid waste 
must be “first placed into or on any land or water and is thereafter 
emitted into the air.”87 To buttress this conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit visited the legislative history of RCRA, highlighting its 
purpose as a system of solid waste control and its lack of any 
provision to regulate airborne emissions, and “even 
                                                
 82 Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1030. 
 83 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2016). 
 84 Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1023. They did not reach 
the second and third prongs “that diesel particulate matter is a “solid waste,” and 
that the solid waste that Defendants emit “may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” id., because plaintiffs 
failed the first. Id. at 1030 n.10. 
 85 Id. at 1024–25 (“[E]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius stands for the 
proposition that when Congress expresses meaning through a list, a court may 
assume that what is not listed is excluded.”); see also supra text accompanying 
note 63. 
 86 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016). 
 87 Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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contemplat[ion] [of] the disposal of material into the air” in its 
original form.88 
This premise is factually mistaken.89 In fact, Congress includes 
an anecdote of a purely gaseous discharge in the legislative history 
underlying the original enactment of RCRA.90 Moreover, the 1984 
Amendments expanded RCRA into regulatory jurisdiction that had 
previously been the exclusive purview of the Clean Air Act, 
expressly due to Congress’ frustration with the EPA’s “appallingly 
slow” performance under the latter.91 
As another scholar has observed, RCRA was conceived to 
“supplement” the media-based regimes—such as the CAA, the 
CWA, and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)—to prevent 
“simply chasing toxic pollutants from one media to the next.”92 
The Supreme Court has previously confirmed that RCRA 
“empowers EPA to regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to 
grave.”93 Thus, in the face of statutory ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit 
should have been more wary of endorsing such a narrow reading of 
the statute, which is concerned not with the media by which solid 
waste may be disposed, but the very disposal of the waste itself. 
The court’s “order-of-disposal” rule94 needlessly creates a 
bright line that may function to exclude citizen suits that Congress 
                                                
 88 Id. at 1026–28. 
   89 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 90 See id. 
 91 S. REP. NO. 98-284, at 63 (1983). The report continued on to note that a full 
quarter of sites on the Superfund National Priority List were at that time had 
been added “at least in part because of potential threats to health and the 
environment from emissions of hazardous pollutants into the air.” Id. 
 92 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of 
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First 
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 83 (2001). 
 93 City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994) (holding ash 
generated by municipal solid waste incinerators is not exempt from RCRA) 
(emphasis added). 
 94 In essence, that RCRA “disposal” exclusively treats waste that is first 
disposed either onto the ground or into the water, from which it may then be re-
introduced to the air. See CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
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intended in enacting RCRA.95 On a practical level, the rule 
provides relatively little guidance for borderline cases. Certainly, 
the Ninth Circuit cannot mean to suggest that hazardous waste 
generators may evade RCRA liability by directing their employees 
to “fling” hazardous waste over the property line, guaranteeing that 
it reaches ground or water only after first passing through the air.96 
Other jurisdictions have avoided the pitfall of this type of rule 
by explicitly engaging in a case-by-case analysis of the facts. In 
United States v. Power Engineering Co., the Tenth Circuit 
determined that a refurbishing facility whose air scrubbers97 
sprayed a condensate mist of hexavalent chromium into the air did 
“dispose” within the meaning of RCRA.98 The lower court had 
previously rejected defendant’s contention that the scrubbers did 
not place “solid waste into or on any land or water,” despite the 
spray’s origin several feet above the ground.99   
A case in the Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in the 
Southern District of Ohio in Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio 
Power Co.100 There, flue gas from a coal plant was seen to touch 
                                                
 95 Recent Case, Environmental Law—Particulate Matter Emissions—Ninth 
Circuit Holds that the Emission of Pollutants from Rail Yards is Not “Disposal” 
of Solid Waste Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Center for 
Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1272, 1276–79 (2015) [Hereinafter “HARV. L. REV. CCAEJ”]. 
 96 See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5–6, Ctr. For Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justive 
v. BNSFR Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-56086) (“From the 
standpoint of [a] neighbor, the result, and the injury, is exactly the same” 
whether hazardous materials enter her by land or air.). 
 97 Air pollution scrubbers remove heavy metals (such as lead and mercury), 
volatile organic compounds (such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides), and 
particulate matter from aerial emissions through chemical and physical 
processes. While scrubbers reduce air pollution, they concurrently increase solid 
and liquid waste streams due to the collected contaminant sludges and process 
water. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Air Pollution Control Technology 
Factsheet 1–4, https://www3.epa.gov/ttncatc1/dir1/fsprytwr.pdf (last visited Oct. 
26, 2016). 
 98 See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
 99 See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1157–58 (D. 
Colo. 1998) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 100 See Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio Power Co., No. C2-04-CV-371, 
2006 WL 6870564 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2006). 
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down on land in visible blue plumes, during which time nearby 
residents experienced headaches and a constellation of respiratory 
problems.101 The court held that the flue gas meets RCRA’s 
definition of solid waste.102 Secondly, despite travelling through the 
air from the top of the coal plant’s 830-foot tall stacks, the 
observed contact of the blue plumes with the ground was sufficient 
to the court to find that such solid waste was discharged onto the 
ground.103 
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected Citizens Against Pollution 
in a footnote as “contrary to RCRA’s text and legislative history” 
without further explanation, it applied the better test. What this 
Recent Development will term the “demonstrable contact” 
standard of Citizens Against Pollution and Power Engineering Co. 
relies on a more fact-specific inquiry, namely (1) whether a 
discharge of a solid waste occurred, and (2) whether there was 
some demonstrable contact between the waste and the ground or 
water. While the first prong considers the expansive definitions for 
solid/hazardous waste under RCRA and CERCLA, the second 
would limit “disposal” liability to circumstances where some form 
of evidence—such as eyewitness observation, as with the blue 
plumes, or chemical testing, as with the hexavalent chromium 
spray—could demonstrate a tangible land or water contact of 
defendant’s specific discharges.104 This test could have facilitated a 
better outcome for the Pakootas case, which is considered below in 
sections C and D. 
C. Structure of the 2016 Pakootas Decision 
As previously outlined, the Ninth Circuit heard Pakootas as an 
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal to grant Teck’s 
                                                
 101 See id. at *1–2. 
 102 “The term ‘solid waste’ means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste 
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and 
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous 
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural 
operations, and from community activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2016). 
 103 See Citizens Against Pollution, 2006 WL 6870564, at *4–5. 
   104 See, e.g., Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; Citizens Against 
Pollution, 2006 WL 6870564 at *2. 
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motion to reconsider allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint 
to include claims for aerially-deposited waste and denying 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss those charges.105 Despite being 
“confident in its analysis” of the question of first impression, the 
Eastern District of Washington certified its order for immediate 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit to review its findings, noting the 
“substantial ground for difference of opinion” on whether 
CERCLA could reach Teck’s aerial emissions.106 In July 2016, the 
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, relying in large part on 
its previous decisions in Carson Harbor and CCAEJ.107 
The court’s legal analysis proceeds through a statutory 
construction peppered with references to Carson Harbor and 
CCAEJ. Confronted with Plaintiffs’ aerial disposition theory that 
(1) Teck “deposited” hazardous substances onto the land or water 
of the UCR site and that (2) “deposit” is one of the words used to 
define “disposal” by 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), the court seized on what 
it saw as the passive implications of that theory.108 Because 
Plaintiffs’ aerial disposition theory appeared to be that Teck 
“allow[ed] hazardous substances to be ‘deposit[ed]’ at the UCR 
Site by the wind,” rather than by depositing the waste there 
directly, the Ninth Circuit determined it must reject their claim 
based on a Carson Harbor footnote.109 The note contends, “as used 
in the statute, the term [deposit] is akin to ‘putting down,’ or 
placement. Nothing in the context of the statute or the term 
‘disposal’ suggests that Congress meant to include chemical or 
geologic processes or passive migration.”110 Section D, below, 
discusses the error of treating this one-off statement as dispositive. 
In addition, the Pakootas court leaned heavily on the recent 
CCAEJ decision, which by its understanding “involved essentially 
                                                
 105 See supra Part II.B. 
 106 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 
7408399, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014). 
 107 See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 108 See id. at 983. 
 109 See id. 
 110 Id. (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d at 879 & 
n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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the same facts.”111 Namely, both cases involved airborne emissions 
of hazardous substances that caused harm first through direct 
inhalation, and then by being later “re-entrained into the air” after 
landing on the ground.112 Pakootas adopted CCAEJ’s analysis of 
the emission omission, paraphrasing that “Congress knew how to 
use the word ‘emit’ when it wanted to,” and suggesting that this 
absence demonstrated Congress’ intent to exclude “emission” from 
the definition of “disposal.”113 However, the court also conceded 
that CCAEJ’s construction of “disposal” within the context of 
RCRA “does not absolutely foreclose a different interpretation of 
‘disposal’ for CERCLA purposes,” instead, that its analysis is 
merely “persuasive.”114 
D. A Better Reading: The Court Should Have Distinguished 
Carson Harbor and CCAEJ 
The Ninth Circuit’s self-constrained opinion in Pakootas 
disappoints the intent of the environmental frameworks it 
interprets, while embellishing distinguishable holdings into a novel 
construction of “disposal” that creates an arbitrary gap in the 
CERCLA field. The court hinted several times that it could be 
persuaded to embrace Plaintiffs’ argument, were it writing on a 
“blank slate” and not constrained to its holdings in CCAEJ and 
Carson Harbor.115 Although the court is correct to note the writing 
on its slate, a more careful examination of the earlier precedent 
reveals that those decisions left the court with plenty of blank 
space in which to scribe a better opinion. 
This part begins by arguing that these cases were 
distinguishable and should not have been applied to prevent 
                                                
 111 Id. at 983–84 (citing Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. 
Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 984 (citing Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 562 
(2007)) (“The natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning . . . is not rigid and readily 
yields whenever there is such variation . . . as reasonably to warrant the 
conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different 
intent.”). 
 115 See id. at 984, 986. 
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Plaintiffs’ theory. However, looking past the shortcomings of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, it also contends that the Supreme Court 
should review this case for two principle reasons. Namely, it 
should repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s 2016 Pakootas decision and 
should also address the circuit split over passive and active 
disposal, which has confused CERCLA litigation nationally. 
It is axiomatic that RCRA and CERCLA require expansive— 
though not unlimited—interpretation, and any analysis of a claim 
based on these statutes must begin by recognizing their broad 
mandates.116 The Ninth Circuit has previously recognized this 
guidance,117 even paying lip service to it in Pakootas, but its 
strenuous work to narrow the reach of “disposal” in recent 
decisions runs counter to this general principle. However, despite 
the similarities of sweeping breadth of RCRA and CERCLA, the 
two schemes do serve different purposes. 
First, notwithstanding the fact that CERCLA borrows its 
definition of “disposal” from RCRA, the two Acts serve distinct 
ends through distinct means.118 The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that “CERCLA differs markedly from RCRA . . . in the 
remedies it provides.”119 Thus, investigation into the legislative 
history and statutory context of either Act may have only limited 
application to the other. The Supreme Court has previously noted 
that the usage of an identical term in different parts of the same act 
may overcome the presumption that “they are intended to have the 
                                                
 116 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“Because it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed liberally to 
effectuate its two primary goals.”); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 
F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) (“As numerous courts have observed, CERCLA is 
a remedial statute which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals.”); 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th 
Cir. 1990) (“We note that a liberal judicial interpretation of the term [“arrange”] 
is required in order that we achieve CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ 
statutory scheme.”). 
 117 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 
1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We construe CERCLA liberally to achieve these 
goals.”). 
 118 See Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 263 (“Thus we agree with the 
Government’s contention that RCRA’s goals differ from those of CERCLA.”). 
 119 Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996). 
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same meaning” where it is clearly demonstrated that the terms 
were “employed in different parts of the act with different 
intent.”120 
An amicus brief to the Pakootas court on behalf of the United 
States argued for such a conclusion regarding “disposal” as it 
relates to the different contexts of RCRA and CERCLA.121 From 
this perspective, the Ninth Circuit should have announced that the 
same statutory and legislative analysis of RCRA that excluded 
diesel particulate matter from the discharging, depositing, 
injecting, dumping, spilling, leaking, and placing122 that constitute 
“disposal” did not yield the same result for the litany of 
contaminants spewed by the Teck Smelter, considered in light of 
the purposes123 and history of CERCLA. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s strong reliance on CCAEJ was 
imprudent because that case can be legally and factually 
distinguished from Pakootas on several grounds. First, the CCAEJ 
decision weighs heavily that the plaintiffs in that case could have 
relied on the CAA to bring a citizen enforcement suit, but resorted 
instead to the less demanding, less on-point standard under 
RCRA’s citizen suit provision.124 
                                                
 120 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007). 
 121 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 
11–12, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 15-35228). Furthermore, as the Pakootas II district court notes, CCAEJ is a 
RCRA case which “makes no mention of CERCLA.” Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *1 (E.D. 
Wash. Dec. 31, 2014). That CERCLA was never contemplated in construing one 
of its central terms underlines the impropriety of letting CCAEJ speak for it. See 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 16, 
Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228). 
 122 See 42 U.S.C § 6903(3) (2016) (defining “disposal”). 
 123 Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 483 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial 
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (C.A. 8 1990)) (“[T]he two . . . 
main purposes of CERCLA . . . prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and 
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party.”). 
 124 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 
13, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228); see also Ctr. for Cmty. Action & 
Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1022 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(describing the much more limited scope of CAA citizen suit provisions than 
those of RCRA). 
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Specifically, CCAEJ took issue with plaintiffs’ attempt to make 
RCRA do the work of the CAA,125 for which there is no factual 
analogy to Pakootas. For the CCAEJ court, the crux of case 
concerned controlling defendants’ aerial emissions of pollutants to 
prevent their inhalation, which it regarded as an “air quality 
problem for the CAA, not RCRA.”126 The court went on to find 
that “‘RCRA, as we interpret it, does not extend to these 
emissions,’ i.e., emissions otherwise regulated by the CAA.”127 On 
the contrary, in Pakootas, the CAA would be barred as an 
extraterritorial application of domestic law precisely because it 
controls emissions—which occur in Canada—but CERCLA is not, 
because it is only concerned with retroactive cleanup for the 
contaminated site—which is located in the United States.128 
Additionally, while the CCAEJ plaintiffs indicated concerns 
primarily with the airborne effects of DPM as a respiratory 
antagonist, the Pakootas plaintiffs highlight that hazardous 
substances contained within Teck’s aerially-released waste “have 
come to be located in . . . the surface water and ground water, 
sediments, upland areas, and biological resources which comprise 
the Upper Columbia River Site.”129 Because these claims focus on 
the accumulation of deposits in the ground, rather than in the air, it 
is clear they do not violate CCAEJ’s order-of-deposit rule.130 
Rather than apply the temporal requirement shakily articulated 
in CCAEJ, the court should have recognized the previous panel 
had “implicitly performed a case-specific analysis into the nature 
of the pollution” and should have done the same here.131 Similar to 
the so-called “demonstrable contact” standard articulated in this 
                                                
   125 See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1022 & n.3. 
 126 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 
14–15, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228). 
 127 Id. at 11–12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. 
Justice, 764 F.3d at 1029). 
 128 See infra discussion of extraterritoriality and CERCLA, Part V.B. 
 129 Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979. 
   130 See supra note 95. 
 131 HARV. L. REV. CCAEJ, supra note 95, at 1279 (noting the court could have 
analyzed such factors as “the density of aerosolized waste, breadth of fallout 
area, concentration of contamination, site of emission, and relevant legislative 
history”). 
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paper,132 a fact-intensive analysis better serves the purpose of 
CERCLA by not excising entire media of transmission from its 
ambit. Had the Ninth Circuit undertaken this type of inquiry in 
Pakootas, weighing factors such as the enormous quantity and 
extensive timeline of Teck’s aerial emissions, their demonstrated 
presence in the soils and waters of the UCR,133 and the extent to 
which other sources were or were not sufficient to account for the 
contamination, the court may have reached a different conclusion. 
Furthermore, as the Pakootas court acknowledged, there may 
be a basis for “deviating” from earlier cases where a rigid 
application “‘would thwart the overall statutory scheme or lead to 
an absurd result’ in some way not considered by those cases.”134 
Intuitively, the wholesale exclusion of airborne contamination 
from a regulatory scheme designed to efficiently address pollution 
and protect public health would seem to be an absurd result, as it 
thwarts CERCLA’s guiding purposes.135 After all, the Pakootas 
court neither claims nor furnishes evidence to suggest that aerial 
contamination represents a somehow negligible effect on human 
and environmental health as compared to water or ground-based 
discharges. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Carson Harbor was equally 
misguided. Like CCAEJ, that case should have been distinguished 
from Pakootas on both factual and legal grounds. Asserting that 
Carson Harbor stands for the proposition that no passive migration 
of contaminants can qualify as a RCRA or CERCLA “disposal”136 
was the Pakootas court’s major error with respect to the former 
case. Instead, the earlier en banc hearing announced a more limited 
holding, in which it “reject[ed] the absolute binary ‘active/passive’ 
                                                
   132 See supra Part IV.B. 
 133 EPA UAO, supra note 16, § II, ¶¶ 4–6. 
 134 Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space 
Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 135 As discussed earlier, CERCLA was designed to (1) rapidly and efficiently 
rehabilitate contaminated sites and (2) ensure that the entities responsible for 
creating the pollution pay the clean-up costs. See supra text accompanying notes 
48–49, Part III.A. 
 136 Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., 
Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 862, 879 & n.7). 
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distinction” employed in other jurisdictions,137 concluding only that 
“‘disposal’ does not include passive soil migration but that it may 
include other passive migration.”138 There the court reasoned that 
even while Congress would not have intended all passive 
migration to qualify as a CERCLA “disposal,” if disposals 
“include only releases directly caused by affirmative human 
conduct,” then CERCLA’s strict liability scheme for “any person 
who at the time of disposal . . . owned or operated any facility” 
would “make no sense.”139 Thus, the Pakootas panel’s notion that 
Carson Harbor eliminated liability for passive migration is not 
only misleading, but also mistaken. 
Instead, even if Teck’s aerial deposits were “passive,” the court 
should have considered whether they were similar enough in 
character to the subset of passive migration excluded under Carson 
Harbor to compel the finding that Teck’s contamination, too, was 
the excluded kind. Although the earlier en banc holding stopped 
short of elucidating which types of passive migration still may 
trigger CERCLA liability, the numerous and material factual 
disparities between the two cases should have guided the Pakootas 
court to distinguish the former. Carson Harbor concerned the 
decades-long migration of hydrocarbons through soil, which 
continued after the conclusion of the petroleum production that 
unleashed it, rather than the highly mobile, and ongoing, aerial 
contamination of Teck’s smelter. The Carson Harbor court also 
worried that if it announced an interpretation of “disposal” 
embracing “all subsoil passive migration” it would virtually 
eliminate the innocent landowner defense.140 There is no such 
                                                
 137 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879–80 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 138 Id. at 881. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 882. The innocent landowner defense prevents 
CERCLA liability where “[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the 
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance 
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, 
or at the facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). The court worried the already narrow 
defense would disappear by adopting a “never-ending” theory of disposal. Id. 
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concern in Pakootas, as Teck has been, and continues to be, 
responsible for the discharges of its plant.141 
Furthermore, even if Carson Harbor had eliminated the 
liability for passive migration, the Pakootas court could have 
simply recognized that Teck’s aerial emissions were anything but 
passive. Unlike the “gradual spread” of spilled chemicals,142 Teck 
unleashed direct and affirmative discharges from its smelting 
process, through a 400-foot tall stack built precisely to carry the 
hazardous waste gases away from the plant.143 After discharge, the 
contained solid wastes from Teck’s flue gas settle out across both 
the land and water of the UCR, bringing Plaintiff’s aerial 
disposition theory well within the intent of RCRA/CERCLA 
“disposal.”144 
It would be difficult, even disingenuous, to argue that 
continuously burning an array of fuels and metals in a tightly 
orchestrated chemical equation for over one hundred years would 
result in the kind of unexpected discharge one might ascribe to a 
leaky barrel. To the extent the court appears to consider a time 
requirement, even allowing that the cumulative deposits accrued in 
the UCR over a long time, it is unlikely that any particular day’s 
worth of discharges hung in the atmosphere for decades before 
falling back to the earth. 
Finally, there were significant policy reasons for the Ninth 
Circuit to reject Teck’s arguments and find its aerial emissions 
                                                
 141 Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. is the product of a 2001 merger between Teck, 
Ltd. and Cominco (formerly Consolidated Mining), which had operated the 
smelter since 1906. See Hess, supra note 17, at 5. Due to the “strict, joint, 
several, retroactive and perpetual” nature of CERCLA liability, Mugdan, supra 
note 10, Teck is a potentially responsible party for the entirety of the smelter’s 
emissions during the last century and beyond. See also discussion of CERCLA 
liability, supra Part III.A. Moreover, the “innocent landowner” defense 
contemplates an unknowing secondary purchaser, such as the Partnership 
defendants in Carson Harbor, supra Part IV.A. This defense would be 
unavailable in a merger between one PRP and another mining company familiar 
with the impacts of the first’s operation, and that continued the site’s operation 
jointly after the merger. 
 142 Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879. 
 143 Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 244. 
   144 See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016). 
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within the reach of CERCLA. Since the enactment of the major 
national environmental legislation and increasingly in recent years, 
citizen suits have been instrumental tools in enforcing the missions 
of the major environmental regulatory schemes, given that: 
The cooperative framework, which presupposes 
diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken 
down. State and federal enforcement budgets are 
being slashed, reducing government oversight and 
potentially allowing more violations of law to go 
unpunished. Moreover, political considerations--
including interstate competition and pressure from 
industry to minimize regulation--threaten to further 
compromise the states’ ability to enforce the laws. 
As government enforcement becomes increasingly 
less reliable, citizen enforcement of environmental 
law is more necessary than ever.145 
Against this backdrop, one might expect the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to exclude an entire media of pollution from the reaches 
of the most important environmental remediation statute would 
have only resulted from restrictive precedent leaving no other 
option. As this review of the Ninth Circuit’s earlier holdings has 
shown, that was not the case. Despite numerous reasons to 
distinguish CCAEJ and Carson Harbor, the court failed to do so, 
creating a regulatory gap further considered below. 
V. AERIAL FALLOUT: PROSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS 
The Ninth Circuit was correct to note its decision will provoke 
“ripple effects,”146 which are considered here. Specifically, this part 
analyzes the narrower effects on the remainder of the Pakootas 
saga in Section A, before attempting to diagnose the far larger 
implications for CERCLA litigation in the United States—and 
beyond—in Section B. To demonstrate the potential restrictions in 
                                                
145 Will Reisinger et. al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of 
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 
20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2010). 
 146 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
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CERCLA’s reach, Section C studies the airborne health threats 
accruing from the maquiladora system of the Mexican Borderlands 
through the lens of the Pakootas decision. 
A. Effects on Remainder of Pakootas Litigation 
The Ninth Circuit’s July 2016 decision in Pakootas has the 
potential to limit the outcomes of not only the case at hand, but 
also all future CERCLA and RCRA suits. In the current case, the 
effects may be more limited. The Pakootas Plaintiffs developed a 
number of theories of CERCLA liability,147 of which aerial 
disposition was only one approach. Even by limiting “disposal” to 
hazardous waste that is “first placed ‘into or on any land or 
water,’”148 the Plaintiffs will be able to proceed with their “river 
pathway” theory. These claims are based on the up to 145,000 tons 
annually (until 1995) of heavy metal-laden slag the Trail Smelter 
discharged directly into the Columbia River, where it flowed into 
the UCR.149 Although the Ninth Circuit has previously determined 
that Teck may be subject to CERCLA liability under this theory of 
disposition,150 excluding the aerial claims may prevent restoration 
of damage caused by Teck’s operations, but not directly 
attributable to its waterborne discharges. Whatever its impact to 
these facts on remand, the application of this holding to the wider 
CERCLA field has the potential to cause far greater havoc. 
B. Potential Effects Across CERCLA Litigation 
As the Ninth Circuit notes, “disposal” recurs throughout 
CERCLA provisions.151 Indeed, the term appears, among other 
places: to define a “facility;”152 within the enumerated varieties of 
“release;”153 and in the definitions of three out of the four classes of 
                                                
 147 Id. at 978–80. 
 148 Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 
1024 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 149 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 150 Id. at 1082. 
 151 Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975, 982–83. 
 152 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2016). 
 153 Id. § 9601(22). 
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“responsible persons,”154 within which a defendant must fall for 
CERCLA liability to attach. The result is to arm potentially 
responsible parties at any CERCLA site involving a question of 
airborne contamination with a powerful precedent to argue against 
their liability. 
Moreover, this decision may eliminate a promising and unique 
avenue for reaching the entry of transnational air pollution into the 
United States. Trans-border pollution presents a thorny problem 
for modern nations, as a receiving country will be unable to 
enforce its substantive law against the producing country.155 While 
CERCLA is no exception to this anti-extraterritorial doctrine,156 the 
Ninth Circuit’s first Pakootas decision in 2006 demonstrated that 
imposing liability on an extraterritorial polluter who causes 
damage within the United States is not an extraterritorial 
application of the law.157 Comparatively, the same court was clear 
that applying United States laws governing the production of 
pollution abroad (as opposed to its effects domestically), would be 
impermissible as an extraterritorial application of law.158 This 
suggests that other national regulatory schemes such as the CAA 
and CWA will be unavailable for any cross-border suits. Instead, 
CERCLA would be uniquely poised to deal with the trans-border 
contamination. The latest Pakootas decision eliminates CERCLA’s 
ability to reach threats of aerial pollution such as the maquiladoras 
just across the United States’ southern border. 
                                                
 154 Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
 155 In the United States, there is a “presumption against extraterritoriality” as it 
relates to the reach of domestic law. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 
385, 388–89 (2005) (“[Common sense] has led Court to adopt the legal 
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not 
extraterritorial, application.”). 
 156 Hess, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 157 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“Because the CERCLA facility [i.e., the UCR site of contamination,] is 
within the United States, this case does not involve an extraterritorial application 
of CERCLA to a facility abroad.”). 
 158 Id. at 1078 (noting that the “Canadian equivalent of RCRA” is applicable 
to Teck’s disposals within Canada). 
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C. Un Ejemplo: las Maquiladoras 
The Maquiladora Program began in 1965 as an economic 
initiative by the Mexican government and incentivized foreign 
companies to open “maquiladoras,” or manufacturing plants in the 
region bordering the United States.159 In 1990 there were 1,700 
maquiladoras, but following the passage of NAFTA, that number 
had grown to 2,810 by 2006, over 80% of which were located in 
states bordering the United States.160 However the significant 
economic and industrial growth spurred by the program has 
outpaced measures to manage industrial waste, leading to failing 
air and water quality.161 This problem spans both sides of the 
border, as the United States and Mexico share a number of 
common airsheds.162 The U.S. and Mexican governments are 
working together on a program to curb sources of trans-border 
pollution from both countries through a non-binding bottom up 
plan called Border 2020, authorized under the La Paz agreement 
between the two countries.163 
Although the overall scheme offers the opportunity to reduce 
airshed-wide pollution, CERCLA suits have the flexibility to 
swiftly identify and penalize the worst polluters, provided their 
discharges of hazardous materials could be traced into the Unites 
States. Should the well-intentioned process break down or advance 
too slowly, after the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 Pakootas decision, 
                                                
 159 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & SECRETARÍA DE MEDIO AMBIENTE Y 
RECURSOS NATURALES, BORDER 2020: U.S. MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROGRAM 10, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/border2020summary_0.p
df (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter EPA BORDER 2020]. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Eileen Zorc, The Border 2012 U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program: Will 
A Bottom-Up Approach Work?, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 533, 544 (2004). 
See also EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 11. 
 162 EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 11. An airshed is conceptually 
analogous to a watershed, but deals with the body of air above a specific 
geography that, due to “topography, meteorology, and/or climate, is frequently 
affected by the same air mass.” U.S. FOREST SERV., Glossary of National Fire 
and Air Workshop Terms 1, http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/rsac/airQ/Glossary.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
 163 Id. 
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which clarified that CERCLA does apply to domestic deposits of 
internationally-generated contamination, citizens could have 
brought suit to compel either remediation or reimbursement for 
undertaking the cleanup themselves. 
This backstop is desirable for two reasons. First, it is elegant to 
apply U.S. law to reach border maquiladoras that “dispose” waste 
into the United States because historically, a majority of the plants 
have been owned by U.S. companies.164 Secondly, and more 
importantly, where the courts of Country A permit suits to reach a 
foreign corporation in Country B that has caused “direct harm to 
the sovereign through transnational pollution,” the principle of 
comity165 suggests that the foreign nation, B, now open to suits, 
will embrace a similar policy as to corporations in Country A.166 
In theory, the specter of being exposed to unlimited liability in 
a foreign country for allowing waste products to pollute there is a 
powerful incentive to self-regulate. In practice, the first phase of 
the Pakootas litigation provoked the U.S. National Mining 
Association to send letters to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and EPA administrator Michael 
Leavitt, “imploring the administration to try and resolve the issue 
through diplomatic means, as a resort to litigation could be 
‘devastating’ if U.S. corporations were forced to defend suit in 
either Canada or Mexico.”167 
                                                
 164 EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 10. 
 165 A fundamental principle of international law, comity concerns foreign 
states’ mutual recognition of one another’s acts and laws, and the reciprocity of 
jurisdictional limits to “maintain[] amicable and workable relationships between 
nations.” See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 
2–4 (1991) (quoting Harold Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 589 (1983)). 
 166 Bret Benedict, Transnational Pollution and the Efficacy of International 
and Domestic Dispute Resolutions Among the NAFTA Countries, 15 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 863, 886 (2009). Importantly, even in the absence of a foreign 
CERCLA equivalent, Superfund itself authorizes foreign claimants to “assert a 
claim to the same extent” as a U.S. citizen under particular circumstances. 42 
U.S.C. § 9611(l)(1)–(4). 
 167 Bret Benedict, Transnational Pollution and the Efficacy of International 
and Domestic Dispute Resolutions Among the NAFTA Countries, 15 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 863, 886 (2009). 
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Thus, the Pakootas decision effectuates a twofold affront to the 
border region. By wholly restricting claims based on the noxious 
aerial emissions across the southern border it creates a regulatory 
gap which subjects U.S. citizens to air pollution beyond redress, 
but it also deprives Mexican citizens of the benefits that would 
accrue from U.S. companies acting to minimize environmental 
liability to their southern neighbors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the first case to consider this specific question of CERCLA 
liability,168 the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to reaffirm 
CERCLA’s broad mandate to protect environmental and human 
health through quick and effective cleanup of hazardous wastes. 
The Pakootas opinion painted the circuit’s earlier precedents in 
CCAEJ and Carson Harbor as creating a narrow and clearly 
defined box into which the current controversy must fit precisely. 
However, a cursory review of Carson Harbor contradicts the 
court’s announcement in Pakootas that it was bound to a rule 
against passive migration. In spite of some similarities, CCAEJ 
was likewise distinguishable on several legal and factual grounds, 
including the unavailability of the CAA as an extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law and the focus of the Pakootas claims on the 
land deposition of Teck’s contamination, as opposed to airborne 
effects alone, saving the theory from the court’s order-of-disposal 
rule. 
Instead, by reading a media-based restriction into “disposal,” 
its holding creates a dangerous new precedent in the federal 
circuits and provides a springboard for industry arguments against 
liability for aerial contamination. Although the Clean Air Act may 
independently reach some of these claims, both the Pakootas case 
and the maquiladoras example demonstrate the gaps in protection 
that will accrue through widespread adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                
 168 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“In over 30 years of CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or 
expressly addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions leading to disposal of 
hazardous substances ‘into or on any land or water’ are actionable under 
CERCLA.”). 
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reasoning. Given the potentially major impacts of this decision, the 
Pakootas Plaintiffs will almost certainly seek certiorari. The 
Supreme Court should grant that petition and dispose with the 
Ninth Circuit’s limited definition for good. 
